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I. JURISDICTION OF COURTS
There have been several developments during the year regarding
jurisdiction over nonresidents.
In 1947 the legislature passed a statute requiring "any unincorporated association or organization, whether resident or nonresident,"
which was doing or desiring to do business in the state to appoint
an agent for the service of process and providing that in case of
failure to appoint the agent, service might be had on the Secretary of
State.' The constitutionality of this act, as applied to foreign associations has since been upheld. 2 A current amendment to the section has
added the words "including non-resident partnerships" at the end of
the phrase in quotation marks above.3
Noseworthy v. Robinson 4 involves a problem of construction of the
nonresident motorist statute. 5 This section provides for service on

the Secretary of State and provides that his "agency . . . to accept
service of process shall continue for a period of one (1) year from the
date of any accident . . . ." Obviously, this language does not require
that the notice to the motorist from the Secretary of State reach him
during this period. In the Noseworthy case the process had been
served on the secretary within the period but it had contained an
erroneous address for the defendant motorist, so that the mailed
process was returned unclaimed. Plaintiff then obtained an alias
summons with the correct address and it was properly delivered; this
was after the statutory period. The supreme court held that the
erroneous address did not invalidate the first summons and that the
*Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-223 (1956).
2. McDaniel v. Textile Workers, 36 Tenn. App. 236, 254 S.W.2d 1 (M.S.
1952), 6 VAND. L. REv. 783 (1953).
3. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-223 (Supp. 1959).
4. 315 S.W.2d 259 (Tenn. 1958).
5. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-224 (1956).
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statute of limitations should not be held to have run. Significance
should be attached to the fact that the correct address was promptly
supplied and the notice promptly delivered.
Another construction problem was involved in Cox v. FidelityPhenix Fire Ins. Co.6 This involved the code provision authorizing
service on the Commissioner of Insurance in a suit against a foreign
insurance company.7 The suit was on a policy of property insurance on
a building located in Kentucky. Plaintiffs, residents of Tennessee,
asked a local insurance company to write the policy; but it, being
unable to write insurance in Kentucky, arranged for a Kentucky agent
to write the policy with the defendant company. The defendant had
qualified to do business in Tennessee, and service was obtained on
the Commissioner of Insurance. The code section provides that such
service may be had "in any action or proceeding ... from any cause
of action arising in Tennessee ...." The court decided that the cause
of action for wind and storm damage to the Kentucky building did not
arise in Tennessee within the meaning of the statutory language. It
was influenced by the fact that the current language was adopted in
1953 and was regarded as more restrictive than the earlier phrase,
"growing out of such business." 8 The actual holding should be confined
to a ruling on construction of the words of the statute, and despite
some of the possible implications in the opinion it would be misleading
to treat the case as indicating that jurisdiction could not constitutionally have been obtained under the facts of the case. 9
6. 313 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. 1958).

7. TE-N. CoD: ANx. § 56-321 (1956).

8. The earlier phrase was found in Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, ch. 119, § 6. The
amendment was made in Tenn. Pub. Acts 1953, ch. 136. By a typographical
error, this is referred to in the opinion as "Public Acts of 1958." 313 S.W.2d at
430.
Doing of business is defined as "the doing in this state by such company of
any act whatsoever, whether interstate or intrastate in nature, including the
soliciting, making, or delivering of insurance contracts in Tennessee, by agent,
mail or otherwise." TENN. COD AN. § 56-319 (4) (1956).
9. There are two bases on which jurisdiction might perhaps be based.
First, the facts of the instant case may come under the principle of McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), 11 VAND. L. Rv. 1437 (1958),
that the mailing of an insurance policy into a state and the receipt of premiums
constitutes such a substantial connection with the state as to subject the
insurer to jurisdiction. Cf. Schutt v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n of
America, 229 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1956), construing the earlier Tennessee code
provisions and applying them to an even more tenuous situation. Second,
even if the cause of action is regarded as having no connection with the
state, if the defendant was doing extensive business within Tennessee and
had an agent for service of process and the plaintiff was domiciled there it
might be found under the principle of balancing the conveniences as laid down
in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), that the
action could be maintained, based on service on the agent. The Perkins
case has substantially modified the earlier approach set out in Simon v.
Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915), which is quoted extensively and relied
on in the instant case.
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FOREIGN JUDGMENTS

In Burden v. Burden,0 the court declined to give full faith and
credit to a custody decree of an Ohio court. The parties had lived together in Ohio, but the husband had ordered the wife "to get out"
and return to Tennessee with the children. He subsequently sued for
divorce in Ohio, and the wife answered. A reconciliation followed, and
the wife understood that the divorce proceeding was dropped. The
husband persisted in it, however, and obtained the divorce and a
decree awarding custody of the children to him. The equity court in
Tennessee enjoined the husband from maintaining a habeas corpus
proceeding predicated on the Ohio decree and itself awarded the children to the mother. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the
Ohio decree was not binding because: (1) the children were domiciled in Tennessee when the divorce proceeding was instituted and (2)
the wife was subjected to constructive fraud since she had no notice of
the hearing and was not accorded due process.
The extent to which custody decrees are subject to the full faith
and credit clause is not entirely clear." There would appear little
doubt, however, that the Tennessee courts would not be bound by the
clause here, where Tennessee was the domicile of both wife and children, none of whom were heard in the Ohio proceeding. If on no
other ground, the Tennessee court could have contended that its holding was based on current facts, presented with all parties present, and
12
warranting a modification of the Ohio decree.
In Robertson v. Robertson 3 the Tennessee Supreme Court had construed the Tennessee sections on probate of foreign wills 14 as providing that when a will has been probated in another state, that proceeding is "in rem and conclusive to all persons having an interest under
the foreign will"-even as to real property located in this state. An
act passed by the legislature has now amended one of these sections,
so as to provide: "Provided, however, that a contest of such will upon
the issue devisavit vel non shall be allowed as to a devise of realty
lying in this state, but as to devises of personalty, the foreign probate
of such will shall be conclusive."' 5 This provision should have no effect
on another code provision to the effect that a will "executed outside
this state in a manner prescribed by the law of the place of its
execution or by the law of the testator's domicile at the time of its ex10. 313 S.W.2d 566 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1957).

11. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
12. See New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
13. 197 Tenn. 218, 270 S.W.2d 641 (1954).

14. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-501 to -516 (1956). This was the UNiFOxM
PROBATE OF FOREIGN WILLS AcT.
15. TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-602 (Supp. 1959), amending TENN. CODE ANN. §
32-502 (1956).
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ecution, shall have the same force and effect" as if executed according
to Tennessee law.16 A question still remaining under the new provision is how far the principle of res judicata should apply to persons
who had actually participated in the foreign probate proceeding and
might be bound individually on the basis of collateral estoppeL' 7
III. CHOICE OF LAw
1. Marriage.-Troxel v. Jones18 involves a common law marriage.
It was a wrongful death action brought by plaintiff for the death of
Henry Troxel, whom she claimed to be her husband. The two had
commenced living together as husband and wife in Nashville and
were domiciled there for several months. They then moved to
Michigan, where they continued to hold themselves out as husband
and wife. While Tennessee does not recognize a common law marriage
as such, a marriage of this nature is valid in Michigan. 19 Michigan
law was held to create a valid marriage between the parties, which
would be recognized in Tennessee. There was a complicating feature,
however. At the time the cohabitation began, plaintiff was married to
one Hutchson and had not been divorced from him. Defendant
showed that plaintiff had not obtained a divorce in Davidson County,
Tennessee, and the lower court held on this ground that there could
be no valid marriage to Troxel. The supreme court reversed on the
ground that defendants had failed to meet the burden of proving
that Iutchson, who had been domiciled in Florida, had not obtained
a divorce there. "The presumption is that she was divorced from the
prior marriage and the later one was valid .... The presumption of
validity of the later marriage is said to be one of the strongest presumptions known to the law."20
16. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 32-107 (1956).
17. See generally Hopkins, The ExtraterritorialEffect of Probate Decrees, 53
YALE L. J. 221 (1944).
The effect of a foreign probate decree was also raised in Troxel v. Jones,
322 S.W.2d 251 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1958), where the decree was relied upon to
establish the status of the plaintiff in the current wrongful death action as
the widow of the decedent. The court found it unnecessary to pass on the
issue.
18. 322 S.W.2d 251 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1958).

19. "[W]here parties engage upon a contract of marriage, which is void
because one has a living lawful spouse, which is unknown to one or both,
uninterrupted cohabitation and reputation after removal of the impediment
will produce a valid common-law marriage, although the fact of the impediment or of its removal may not have been known to either." Grammas v.
Kettle, 306 Mich. 308, 311, 10 N.W.2d 895, 896 (1943) (quoting from earlier
cases).
20. 322 S.W.2d at 257. The court apparently treats this presumption as a
matter of proof, to be governed by Tennessee law. It could be argued
that it is a part of the Michigan substantive law in determining whether
the second marriage was valid or not. But the result would probably have
been the same.
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2. Partnerships.-InSpencer Kellogg & Sons v. Lobban2 ' defendant
Lobban, a broker located in Memphis, had negotiated a contract for the
sale from the plaintiff company, of Buffalo, N. Y., to the Red River
Cotton Oil Co., a Louisiana partnership of ten carloads of soybean
6il. The contract was signed by the plaintiff in Buffalo and sent to
Alexandria, Louisiana, where it was signed by the Red River Co.
Plaintiff now sues the defendant on the contract in Tennessee-contending that defendant was actually a partner in the Louisiana company and therefore liable on its obligations. The defense was that the
action could not be maintained against the defendant without joining
the partnership as a defendant. Under Louisiana law, a partnership
is a separate legal entity similar to a corporation in other states, and
liability must be established against the partnership in order for any
liability to exist against an individual partner.
The lower court held that the requirement that the partnership be
joined as a defendant was substantive rather than procedural, so that
the Louisiana rule applied. The supreme court agreed with the result,
which seems to be clearly correct. The Louisiana rule concerns not
simply the question of parties to an action, but the matter of the
existence of liability, since the obligation of an individual partner
is not primary and does not come into being "until the debt is
22
established contradictorily with the partnership."
3. Torts.-Glover v. Glover2 3 involves the problem of intrafamilial
tort immunities. A nineteen-year-old son sued his parents for injuries
received in an automobile accident which occurred in Alabama.
Though the suit was in Tennessee, the court of appeals held that
Alabama law controlled as to whether the action could be maintained.
There was no Alabama law directly in point, and the court decided to
follow the majority rule, under which no immunity exists when the
son has been emancipated. The question of emancipation was held
to be one of fact for the jury.24
This question of immunity can be characterized in three waysas a matter of procedure, as a matter of tort law or as a matter of
family law. Since the parties were domiciled in Alabama, 25 Tennessee
21. 315 S.W.2d 514 (Tenn. 1958).
22. Rheuark v. Terminal Mud & Chem. Co., 213 La. 732, 35 So.2d 592, 594
(1948). The question of what law should apply if the Louisiana partnership
went into another state and transacted business there does not appear to
be raised in this case. The final acceptance of the contract took place in
Louisiana and the delivery was apparently to occur there too.
23. 319 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1958).
24. There were two bases urged: (1) the son had enlisted in the Army
with the parents' consent; (2) the father had earlier contracted with the son
for farming work of his own.
25. This was not disclosed in the opinion, but was information supplied by
attorneys in the case.
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law would apply only if the issue was regarded as one of procedure,
or if there was a strong local public policy against allowing the
suit. There was no Tennessee authority directly in point*, and the
court's statement that Alabama law should apply because the accident
happened there announces the majority rule.
Two other cases decided during the year may present choice of law
problems, though the opinions make no reference to them and the
26
facts are not clear.
*But see Lucas v. Phillips, 326 S.W.2d 905 (Tenn. 1957) which, though
decided in 1957, was not published until October 6, 1959. The court in
Glover made no reference to the Lucas case.

26. Tennessee Packers, Inc. v. Tennessee Cent. Ry., 319 S.W.2d 502 (Tenn.

App. M.S. 1958), involving, among others, a negligence count against carriers
for losing tallow in a trip from Clarksville to Ohio. The tallow apparently
leaked out of a tank car just after it had crossed the Tennessee line into
Kentucky. This is not perfectly clear, and the issue is not treated. It would
probably have made no difference in the result.
Patterson v. Anderson Motor Co., 319 S.W.2d 492 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1958),
involves an action on a contract for the sale of an automobile agency in
Olive Branch, Mississippi. The contract was apparently executed in Memphis
but was to be performed in Mississippi. The court applied the parol evidence
rule of Tennessee without reference to the law of Mississippi. Two conflicts
questions might thus have been raised. Is the parol evidence rule a matter
of procedure or substance? If the latter, is it controlled by the law of the
place of making or the place of performance?

